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"STRENGTH  AND  VULNERABILITIES  OF  THE  FREE  MARKET  IN  EUROPE 
PARTICULAR  REFERENCE  TO  CHEMICALS" 
The  very  recent  GATT  negotiations,  with  respect 
to the  chemical  sector  in the  United  States and  in Europe,  have 
shown  quite distinctly where  our  respective strengths  and  weaknesses 
lie. 
In Petrochemicals  and  Fertilizers the European 
Community  has  been  on  the defensive whereas  in the organic  inter-
mediates  and  the- more  sophisticated chemicals  and  products  it  was 
the  United  States  which  was  on  the defensive.  This  was  particularly 
so  for  dyestuffs,  pharmaceuticals  and  cosmetics  excepted. 
It is our  feeling  that on  smaller  volumes  intermediate 
•' 
and  finished  organic  chemicals  we  are well  diversified and  efficient 
in -europe. 
.. .........  ;.;.  2  -
It is probable that  in general  the trade di st ribut ion 
systems of our  chemical  Companies  are  more  developped  abroad  than  those 
of  US  Companies.  Even  for  the  US  market  US  companies  seem  t~ be 
f-relatively  Less  interested in  small  volume  business  for  fine  chemicals 
.:;:and.  intermediates.  Te>-·an  increasing extent  they  leave that part of 
1Z::·the  home  market- to their. European  competitor.s. ( (This  is  ..  shown  by  the 
~.evo'tution ot.>be.nzeno'ld :i-mports  into the  USr where~ for  1978  imports 
'-~exceeded US  .o.utput). 
·,:On  the reverse"  we  cannot  .... say that  we  have. no  problems 
,:  wit~ petrochemicals.  Generally .speaking,  we  are  more  vulne.rable.  where 
•, ... we  depend  substantially or enHrely on  raw_ materials  suppl ies• trom.  out-
,;;  side. the  Community  as  is the  case  with  crude  and  with -rock  phosphat.e. 
:HM01'e;precdsely.  1.: should  say that this  is an  area  where 
we  either are or .c.ould.  become· vulnerable  and  where  our  at  tent ion  should 
,.  be  focussed  first,.on- a  sober  analytical  approach,  and  then eventually 
•' 
r.: through action ~to.<SO.bte: ·the problems. 
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The  European  Community  is concerned  by 
- the petrochemical  industry development  of the Arab  world,  particularly 
·in the Gulf  region  (a potential  problem  in  the  late eighties). 
- the petrochemical  industry development  of  Eastern  European  countries 
Ca  potential  problem  in the eighties). 
- the gas  and  crude  price controls  related to petrochemical  cost 
advantages  in  the  US  Ca  real  problem). 
I  will  go  along  these  problem  areas  in detail. 
But  I  should  nevertheless  make  one  general  aspect  very  clear before 
When  speaking  about  problems  linked to the  Arab  ·' 
region,  to  Eastern  Europe  and  to the United  States this doesn't  mean 
in any  case  that all our  problems  are  imported.  In  view  of the over-
capacities existing  in  Europe,  it is fair to say  :  part of the problem 
was  home  made. .  - 4-
__ ....  :·· 
But  one  must  also admit  that  before 73  it was 
extremely difficult  to believe that  the  fabulous  growth  rates  for 
petrochemicals  demand  could ever  dive to the  levels  where  they  are 
now.  It was  on  overwhelming  tempt at ion  for  industry to  invest  with 
(nearly)  closed eyes,  and  all  the more  easily the more  Governments, 
t'eii!P'ted  too  by  attractive job creation potentials for  regi-onal 
developments  t·ook ::over  generous parts of  <virtually not  existing) 
financial  risk :by--g-ranti-ng  public  funds. 
ltlis-is one  r'ea~n for  a  certain part of the O\i'er-· 
c.:apacities still  .exis1:ing _in  the  Community. 
Another_ reason  lies  in the  fact  that  for  the- invest- . 
ment  expenditures :and  for  t·he  Community  as  a  whole  the pre  1973  trend. 
continued. unbroken--up  to 1975  included  !  It  was  not  before  1976  that 
ion  an  overall  COmmunity  bas'i:s  the petroleum crisis  i_mpac.t  on  petro---
chemical  investment  betlavi-~ur became ·apparent.  It took  two  years  in 
,! 
'Europe to realize:·the:-full  impact of the petroleum crisis and  to  influence  , 
investme-nt  decisions.  This  is all the  more  astonishing  if one  looks  at  .. 
the  investment·  benavi-bu~ of the reiinery  industries of the  European 
Community .  - 5 -
This sector,  apparently,  realized much  quicker than the petrochmical 
industry the  real  importance  of  the 73  crude  price rise and  drastically 
diminished  investment  expenditures  already  in 1974. 
So  a  good  deal  of our  petrochemical  overcapacity was  home  made  because 
for  at  least over  two  years  the petroleum  crisis was  underestimated. 
Capacity utilization is  improving  now  in  Europe  but 
it had  been  down  to very  preoccupying  levels.  Over  the  recent  two 
quarters  business  cycles  evolved  more  positively. 
In  spite of this serious situation  in the past ~ 
chemical  ~arkets remained  essentially open. 
This  has  been  shown  by  GATT  negotiations  in the  frame-
work  of the Tokyo  Round  where  we  made,  initially, a  full  formula  offer  .. 
and  we  only  withdrew  afterwards  and  in part  a  series of concessions 
.. 
because  the  concessions  of our  trade partners didn't  seem  to be 
satisfactory. . -·6-
But  the preponderantly open  state of our  chemical 
market  is also reflected  in the activities of the  Commission  on  a 
commercial  defense  line  : 
To  illustrate this. I  would  like to  stat.e.: thatc out  of 
79· cases of  commerci"at. d&fense  since 1970  20· involved  chemicals,  5  of 
which  in. the  f·iber  sect:a.r,.  3  cases  involved the· us.  In only  one  of the 
chem·ical  cases,, an'. antidumping  duty  was  established,  but  not  far  long;;. 
as" our  trading~ partner preferrethto adapt  his: price. 
8.·  cases  were  broug;h:t. t:ct  an  end by  voluntary  uodentak ings,. 6· as  a  re.sul t 
of: the  development·s,  one  was  rejJ!,Cted  and  only  4  cases  are sti.ll pending. 
8)!  the way,  most·  of' th'es.e  chem.ical. cases  were  directed against  imports 
from· Eastern  European  countri-es  ... 
Our-·  commercial  de.fens~ sys.tem  is thus  very  critical but  not  at  aU.: 
Fo.n .t.he  future· we·  would  like very  much  to maintain 
such  a  dynamic  and: open  trade poli:ey  provided that  trade  competiti~on 
•' - 7  -
In other words  :  we  will  be  very  critical of  unfair 
competition.  We  wish  fair  competition  and  this  holds  for  all  the 
problem  areas  which  I  am  now  going  to discuss. 
Two  of our  problem  areas 
- t~e petrochemical  development  of the  Arab  region  and 
- the petrochemical  development  of  Eastern  Europe, 
are of more  medium  or  longer  term  impact  on  the economic  behaviour 
of our  chemical  industry but  nevertheless  they  have  caused  a  lot  of 
ink  to  flow  and  generate  much  hot  air. 
Petrochemical  developments  in the  Arab  world 
We  have  studied trade  relations with  the  Arab  world, 
•' 
as' well  as  the market  for  turnkey  projects,  as part of the  Euro-Arab 
dialogue. 
a 
~ 
~-I  . 
So  far  as  trade  agreements  are  concerned,  we  have 
-·the Lome-Agreement  to 4  (Djibouti,  Mauretania,  Somalia,  Sudan> 
.,_--~the'Ma~hreb  Agreements  to Algeria,  Morocco  and  Tunisia 
·"·-'"the' M~ch~ak Agreements  to  Egypt,  Jordan,  Lebanon  and  Syria. 
'But: by  fa/the most  important  feature is th·e  Generalised System  of 
·Preferences,. since. it  .. applies toc:all  Arab  countries  • 
.  ·When  looking ~at·our trade  in  chemicals,  we  see that 
'.our  exports  are:welL:diversified.over the  Arab  world.  As  to  our~imports 
~'from. those  countries,,·we· note steady -increases but  not  yet  on· an 
;:alarming'oScale~:: 
.... _  ammonia  has  beenq:omiog .into.·. the .community  for  quite  a  number  of; years 
with ·a  surge in::1978; 
•' 
.,_;;some. ethylene-.:.sta~tedTto,flow  1 in''1978,. some: methanol  since·:1976,, with 
an  upsurge  stnce-:1978; 
.  . - 9 -
/ 
there are  consistent  imports  of phosphate  fertilizers  from  Egypt, 
Lebanon,  Morocco  and  Tunisia  with  an  upsurge  for  Morocco  since 1977 
and  for  Tunisia particularly since 1976.  Some  urea  is beginning  to 
flow  too. 
However,  when  we  look  at  the technology  and  turnkey 
project  market  in  the  Arab  world,  a  disquieting picture emerges. 
Arab  countries  have  embarked  on  a  vigorous·and  rather  narrowly-based 
development  programme  in the  last  two  years.  The  capacities  launched 
correspond  roughly  to one-half of the present  capacity of the  whole 
Community  for  products  such  as  ethanol  (49  r.>,  methanol  (60  r.>, 
ammonia  (58%)  and  phosphoric  acid  (43  %);  while  for'urea, their 
projects will  surpass  Community  capacity  (104  r.>. 
The  desire of the  Arab  region to upgrade  their natural 
resources  is entirely  legitimate and  natural. 
It is economical  to the extent that -·· 
.....  ...  --
;.· 
_.,. 
it 
~  ... 
·' 
I. - it is  in this type of activity that the  valuat~on of the other 
factors  (capital/labour)  can  be  the best  in that  region  (classical 
theory of  comparative  advantages); 
- ~he rhythm  with  which  the new  productions  develop  do•not ·wr..ee:k  the 
'l~Dt'Ld market :of  the products  concerned,  because, then, .,the  .. first 
:eondi.tion · C·im•'!t. :be·· fu!fi lled. 
T:he  ·risk ·to \Wr.'e'Ck  a  market ·ts ,not  an  i Uusion .::  ":to 
the rhythm  of  the ·gT:owth  of  c:ons:umption  and  the  rhythm  o.f  the: repl.ac't!ment 
o'f obsolete.un:t-ts:by ·new.and  Jm!JM!  efficient plantS,  the pri·ce ·Level of 
~he ·pr.:D'duct s  conside·red ;.will tend to go  down  to the  level of ·  v:ar'iabl.:e 
. 
·:co-st·s  of marginaLmi:t:s  i:n ,other  words,  to  a  price level  whi·ch  ·w.il:l 
cover "nnly .vecy rpar:tiaLly"the  fixed costs of most  modern  units  (and 
the ·less the.  •IJII7rtHtbe"111BrcQina1  .unt.ts  are modern) .. 
;1\nd,;pri ces  couL'd <St~y ~·:such levels as  long .:as - 11  -
This  situation could  be  changed  only  if the producers 
of the  rest  of the  world  would  abandon  fighting  on  prices  in order  to 
maintain their volume  of production.  This  is conceivable only  if they 
may  be  assured that their competitors  from  raw  material  producing 
countries  will  restrict themselves  to a  certain market  share  for  the 
products  considered and  they  will  enter  into  new  productions  at  a 
reasonable  rhythm  and  aiming  at  a  reasonable  market  share,  in  other 
words  if their behaviour  is rigorously  economical  • 
Such  a  development·would  correspond  as  much  to the 
general  interest than  to the  interest of the companies. 
General  interest  is here  touched  upon  in the  largest 
sense of the  notion  :  not  only  of the countries  in which  the  production 
of  chemicals is actually situated but  also the  interest of  countries 
producing  raw  materials,· if one  considers that  they  could not  reasonably 
hope  to  recover  losses  which  they  have  to  face  when  imposing  themselves 
on  the markets  for  downstream  products  by  receiving - at  a  later stage -
of a  monopoly  rent  on  those  same  products. -12-
..... 
Let  us  hope  then that  what  wi~l happen  on  the world 
market  in the future  will  comply  strictly with good  economic  logi.c  .• 
And  it is the  role of politics to make  sure that  things  happ:en·.that 
P-etrot:herni cat developme:n~s in  Eastern. Europe•. 
Our  studies ~o.fi  ~-h:emical  compensation  agreements  wi.t;h 
East~ European.  e:ount~'ie:s:; over  thevtast three or  four  yea~s tend:··t'o;.:shoWJ 
tbat',_tbe volumes.;invo.bted until, now  give  no  cause  for·>us  to exp.e4:t;.  _an,: 
at.a.rming 'increaseda:mar.ke:t pe.n~Tat  ion  into  the  European  Commt~n.ity., 
hut  for  some  2«l~o:tbett:pmdw:ts we; see. no  problem.  Indeed,  the 1110'S:. 
recent  figures .Se.eat.m :inditat~~a:de;c!ine in deals of this nature·  • 
.. 
studying  the chemrh::at pttdng policy of these.countries  for  their export.s 
to our  markets. 
., 
···~. .  - 13  -
We  have  examined  unit  prices  (~hat  is to say  value 
divided  by  volume  of product)  and  think  we  have  detected consistent 
under-pricing, particularly for  soda  ash  and  most  of  the termoplastfcs, 
involved  in  non  buy-back  arrangements. 
One  possible explanation of those  low  prices  could 
be  that  it is very  difficult to enter our  market  at  higher prices 
because  the producers  already present on  the market  fight  to maintain 
their output.  Excessive  imports  either  from  Eastern  European  or  from 
Arab  countries tend  to bring  the prices  at  the  level  of  the variable 
costs of the  marginal  producers.  At  such  prices,  the  number  of  cases 
in which  Eastern countries  have  a  real  economic  interest  in building 
new  plants essentially for  export  is probably  limited;  they  can  only 
make  a  prbfit  in selling marginal  quantities  from  plants whose  production 
goes  mainly  to their home  market. 
Those  economic·constraints  have  perhaps  not  always  been  clearly felt, 
especially  in  the first  buy  back  deals but  the  learning  process  seems 
to be  on  the move.  I  hope  in the  interest of all  concerned parties 
that it will  bear  its fruits  before  we  get  into major  trouble • 
.. 
I
'''"·J; 
~: 
' 
,' 
-~--... 
·;: .. The  advantages  to the  us  petrochemical  industry derived  from  price 
controls:.on gas  and  crude oil 
We:  in the  Community  have  made  some  interesting 
catculati  ons  of  .the' cost  ..  advantages,:avai lab  lei to·r.petrochemical 
producers on  thiS  side--;of the Atlantic  as  a  tesutt' of price controls 
ont;gas~and: crude oil •.  Th!picture is.complicatedsince ther-,effect 
appears twice.:  both  in the  form  of·cheaperraw meterial,  and:c:heaper~:-
energy--in,  the~ various  conversion,:processes.  :; . Thel picture  i sc furtherre•· 
compl:icated  by  otherrc:,te-chni cal  or:: natural  advantages  enj'oyed::--'by  -sorae·  £ 
US<'producers.  Suffice it to  say::that  us  producers  seem  to  be•abte·~-::· 
to produce  basic··petrochemicals at  two-thirds of the  European· costs; 
and  about  half or···more·-of;.the  us· advantage  is derived ·from  raw··material 
costs;;, .. 
Oit·:and· gas price•controls  are to  be  phased out;. 
but  some  will  la.st:-until  1985,.  so.':tong  as  they exist, they  can  be:., 
said to constitutetandndirect·subsiidj to.usupetrochemicals·: 
'j - ' 
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a  subsidy  which  distorts  international  competition  and  although  for 
most  of  those products  the exports  from  the  US  to  Europe  did not 
raise considerably,  this does  not  mean  that  the  impact  of the  cost 
differencials  is not  already  deeply  felt. 
Even  if most  of  the American  petrochemical  compagnies 
did not  and  were  not  to try to export  mor~, offers  from  commercial 
intermediaries  are enough  to oblige producers  of  some  sensible products 
to  keep  their prices at  a  level  wherethey  sell with  a  loss. 
I  do  believe that  price controls were  not  intended 
to  have  this  subsidizing  effect  in  international  trade when  they  were 
adopted  by  the American  government,  and  I  am  quite  sure that  the u.s. 
realise that 
they  have  no  real  interest  in exporting  under  the  form  of petrochemicals 
their natural  resources  in petrol  and  gas  at prices below  their present  .  ,, 
value on  the  world  market 
·' - 16-
/. 
- they  have  neither  interest, doing  so,  to put  european producers 
in trouble  :  their  real  interest  is more  to  have  fair  competition 
ensuring  that all over  the free  world  the. industry will  tr·ansform 
scarse  raw  materials  at  the  lowest  costs. 
s·o  1' exp.ect  to find  a  larg:e~ meas.ure  of  unde;r;:standing 
wn~''\re. ·tack  lie.  this  issue:· in Washington,  t?mor:row. and  .1  hope: ·tnat  here 
aiiso. we  will  b.e~ :abte. to prevent  going· on  a  collision  course  .. , . 
;.-... 
.~- . 